Because their choices varied, the reimbursement for a HCPC covering a multi-source drug, or a single source drug available in different forms or package sizes, varied across carriers. 5 Although such variation was typically on the order of 10 percent or less, it was much larger for some commonly prescribed chemotherapy drugs. 6 For example, in 1999 the spread between the highest and lowest reimbursement for 10mg Doxorubicin was about 27 percent ($52.44 versus $38.03). Moreover, these reimbursements changed differentially over time based on revisions to the AWP for specific NDCs.
Data Sources

Cohort Development
To study chemotherapy treatment, we analyzed the Each standardized dose was then priced using the average "national" (across all SEER regions) reimbursement for that agent within a tumor site and year and summed for all drugs a patient received. By using national average prices to determine expenditure, any variation across patients is attributable to the drugs prescribed rather than the prices paid to physicians. Furthermore, by standardizing dosages, this measure captures a physician's initial regimen choice, rather than any adjustments dictated by a patient's tolerance of and response to treatment.
Definition of Explanatory Variables
To measure how generously each physician was reimbursed, we defined a summary measure or index for the set of regimens prescribed by a provider for a given tumor site in a given year. The index was the sum of the weighted average difference between the physician's and the national mean reimbursement for each agent the physician prescribed, where the weights were the ratio of national spending on a regimen to total spending on all chemotherapy regimens (see appendix). In some analyses we deflated the index by Medicare's 1997 Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) for the relevant region in order to account for variation across regions in the cost of administration.
In summary, this index captured how generously an individual physician was reimbursed relative to the national average for the set of agents that physician prescribed.
Statistical Analyses
To model the impact of reimbursement generosity on a patient's likelihood of chemotherapy treatment we used probit regressions with provider-specific random effects.
Our models include year indicator variables to control for national trends in treatment patterns.
We also controlled for a patient's age and age Comorbidities were identified from diagnostic billing codes for various conditions in both inpatient and outpatient claims, assigned scores based on severity, and then summed to form an index, the Deyo-Charlson score. 13 When we estimated results across all tumor sites, we also included indicator variables for tumor site.
To estimate the impact of the provider's reimbursement generosity on the expensiveness of chemotherapeutic agents prescribed, we used linear regressions with providerspecific random effects. We conducted our analysis pooling across tumor sites as well as separately by site, since the types and costs of regimens varied markedly by cancer site.
We included year indicator variables in all models and controlled for the same set of patient characteristics as in the probability of chemotherapy models.
Results
Chemotherapy Utilization
Exhibit 1 presents summary statistics for metastatic cancer patients overall and by cancer site. were also similar when we restricted the sample to those who initially presented with Stage IV disease or considered the probability of chemotherapy treatment within 28 days rather than three months of a metastatic cancer diagnosis (results not shown).
Costliness of Agents Used
Monthly chemotherapy spending varied markedly across tumor sites (Exhibit 1, row 2). Metastatic breast and colorectal cancer patients on average received regimens that cost less than $1,000 per month, whereas the regimens prescribed to other GI cancer patients cost on average $1,400 per month and to lung cancer patients over $3,600
per month.
The reimbursement index had a significant effect on the costliness of chemotherapeutic agents prescribed These results were even stronger and more precisely estimated when we used Medicare's GPCI to deflate the reimbursement index and projected chemotherapy spending (Exhibit 4). We could not know the administrative costs of each physician, but since any practice cost deflator should apply only to administrative costs and not the cost of the drug itself, the results with and without the practice cost deflator should bound the true effect of variation in reimbursement.
Discussion
We found no evidence that reimbursement incentives affected oncologists' decisions to administer chemotherapy to metastatic cancer patients. Once a decision to give chemotherapy was taken, however, physicians receiving more generous Medicare reimbursements used more expensive treatment regimens. Except for the non-colorectal gastrointestinal cancer site, which was so heterogeneous that such patients may not have been well characterized in our data, these results were similar whether aggregated or stratified by tumor site.
Our study has some limitations. To ascertain chemotherapy we relied on claims data, which are not created for research and may be less accurate than desired.
Claims-based comorbidity measurement is not the same as performance status on which clinicians make treatment decisions.
The use of Medicare data limited us to elderly patients, and practice patterns and incentives may differ for younger patients with commercial insurance.
Nonetheless, many commercial insurance companies also base reimbursement rates on AWP. A survey of 32 health plans found that many reimbursed for chemotherapy drugs at 95 percent of AWP, but others reimbursed at rates as low as 75 percent and still others at rates as high as 125 percent of AWP. 15 If our results generalize to the commercially insured, they suggest that chemotherapy administration to such patients should be little affected by such variation, but the mix of agents may well respond.
As noted in the introduction, Medicare no longer uses AWP as a basis for reimbursement. Our results suggest that rates of chemotherapy administration will not change much provided oncologists continue to accept Medicare patients.
On the other hand, since physicians will no longer differentially profit from using particular agents, this new reimbursement method may modify the mix of chemotherapy drugs used.
Oncologists are loath to acknowledge that financial 
Data and Methods Technical Appendix
The goal of this study was to estimate the impact of Medicare reimbursement on chemotherapy treatment. Because the study relied on retrospective claims data, great care
had to be taken to account for potential unobservable characteristics of patients, clearly identify treatment, and quantify reimbursement and spending. The more technical aspects of these efforts are detailed here.
A. Additional Methodological Details Cohort Development
To minimize differences in treatment due to unobserved patient health, we limited our sample to patients with To further increase homogeneity, we excluded patients who had more than one primary cancer. Males were excluded from the breast cancer sample. We also excluded the less Please do not cite or circulate than one percent of patients whose dates of diagnosis or death differed by more than two months in the SEER and Medicare claims databases, or whose cancer was first identified at the time of death or autopsy.
We eliminated the 16 percent of patients who were enrolled in a health maintenance organization (HMO) at some point during the study period because we lacked complete treatment and billing information for them.
Outcome Ascertainment
Receipt of Chemotherapy
The specific codes used to identify chemotherapy 
Definition of Explanatory Variables
We calculated the relative generosity of reimbursement to a provider using a weighted average difference of a provider's reimbursement for each prescribed regimen relative to the average for that regimen nationally for a given tumor site and year. We used this weighting scheme to standardize across providers for the mix of drugs used and thereby ensure that the index captured reimbursement rather than practice pattern differences.
Specifically, an oncologist's reimbursement level was computed using the set of regimens prescribed by provider i in year t for tumor site s. 
Statistical Methods
In all models, we included provider random effects because of the grouped-error nature of the data; many patients are treated by the same physician and thus their treatment decisions will be affected by the same physicianspecific practice patterns. Because we incorporate physician-specific random effects and year indicator variables that control for common time trends, the effects we estimate are identified off of changes in reimbursement and treatment within physicians relative to the nation over our sample period, as well as some element of betweenphysician variation.
Use of Reimbursement as the Principal Explanatory Variable
As pointed out in the text, reimbursement is the policy relevant variable, and we believe that it is highly correlated with profit. Nonetheless, our estimated response to reimbursement could differ from the response to profit for two reasons. First, there is undoubtedly some variation across physicians in purchase prices. If we were trying to measure the response to profit and used reimbursement as a measure of profit, any random variation in purchase price would be random measurement error and would bias down our estimate of the response to profit.
Although we cannot know the magnitude of any such bias, we believe a generous assumption is that the magnitude of any variation in purchase price would equal the variation in reimbursement. If so, our estimates as a measure of response to profit should be doubled, but we would still conclude that profit potential had little effect on the probability of chemotherapy. On the other hand, our conclusion that profit potential altered the mix of agents used would be even stronger. 
